28 lF

Abstract

Keywords

Common-law employment contract; labour legislation; good faith; fairness; implied duty of trust and confidence; implied duty of fair dealing; constitutional development of the common law; right to fair labour practices; breach of the employment contract.

…………………………………………………….

1 Introduction

Part 1 of this piece sketched the background to the debate regarding the importation of fairness into the common-law employment contract. It briefly considered the interaction between the common law and labour legislation within the "single system of law" of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter the Constitution) and then considered the development of the common law which occurred in a line of Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgments, including Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt,1 Old Mutual Life Assurance Co. SA Ltd v Gumbi,2 Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya,3 and Murray v Minister of Defence.4 In this part I will ask whether that development of the common law, and particularly Murray's recognition of the implied duty of fair dealing, has survived the SCA judgment in SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie5 in 2010, and where we are now, following that case.

2 What happened in McKenzie?

The above-mentioned line of cases (discussed in Part 1 of this piece), which came before the SCA and involved consideration of the continued role of the common law in employment disputes alongside the statutory rights and remedies generally, and the development of the common-law duty of mutual trust and confidence in order to recognise a generally-applicable implied duty of fair dealing more specifically, culminated in the judgment of the same court in McKenzie. It appears to be commonly accepted that Wallis AJA's judgment in this case brought an end to the SCA's dalliance with implied common-law terms regarding fairness in the employment contract in the earlier cases, and that the SCA here confirmed the supremacy of the statutory scheme of rights and remedies in unfair dismissal cases and expressly rejected the notion of an implied term against unfair dismissal in the common-law employment contract. I do not agree, and will argue as follows:

McKenzie involved a claim for damages for breach of contract by an employee who had earlier approached the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) with an unfair dismissal claim and had been awarded compensation. The respondent claimed that the appellant, by terminating his employment contract, had breached a term of the contract that it would not be terminated without just cause. Wallis AJA (writing for the majority)6 identified the claim before the court by observing that "[b]earing in mind that the breach of contract is said to lie in the 'unfair dismissal' of Mr McKenzie the allegation in the particulars of claim that the contract could not be terminated 'without just cause' must be taken to mean that it could not be terminated unfairly and this is the basis of the case advanced." After finding that the respondent could not prove the existence of such a term in the contract as either an express or a tacit term, the court considered whether the tacit existence of such a term in the contract should be implied. In respect of the source for such an implied term, the court held that such a term could either be said to flow from the provisions of section 185 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) dealing with unfair dismissal or could lie in a development of the common law in accordance with section 39(2) of the Constitution. Wallis AJA held that the respondent's claim was based on the first of these propositions (the importation of the LRA's unfair dismissal provisions into the contract of employment).7 The court then continued to find that there was no merit in this claim, for a number of reasons. I will subsequently recount those reasons, along with my submissions of why they may not hold water.

The first reason for rejecting the existence of the alleged implied term (not to be unfairly dismissed) was the court's finding that there was no indication in the express wording of the legislative scheme regarding unfair dismissal (as contained in Chapter VIII of the LRA) that the legislature intended the provisions of the scheme to be imported by implication into the employment

contract. Wallis AJA observed that a clear legislative indication of such an intention is required where a statute creates statutory rights which a claimant relies on to have provided additional (for example, common law) remedies outside of the relevant statutory remedies created to enforce the statutory right.8 After examining the provisions of Chapter VIII of the LRA, the court held that (unlike some other provisions of the labour legislation which expressly provide for the incorporation of terms into the employment contract, such as section 23(3) of the LRA and section 4 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA)) section 185 of the LRA "and the remaining sections that deal with unfair dismissals do not contain any such express provision incorporating them into contracts of employment."9 Accordingly, the respondent's argument would have to sink or swim not on the basis of the express legislative incorporation of such provisions into his contract, but rather on whether they were to be implied from the relevant provisions of the LRA as read with the Constitution.10

Wallis AJA continued to find that this could not be the case, on the grounds that, firstly, the exact duplication of the legislative provisions (for example, the unfair dismissal provisions of the LRA) would be pointless and could thus not have been the intention of the legislature; and secondly, if what was claimed to have been imported into the contract was something more than the provisions of the legislation (for example, an unqualified right not to be subjected to unfair labour practices, as opposed to the more limited, codified definition of an unfair labour practice as contained in section 186(2) of the LRA) it would be "logically impermissible when we are dealing with incorporation by implication."11

By way of reply, I would suggest that the above reasoning, while seemingly cogent and convincing, may be of questionable relevance when one considers that the SCA in McKenzie was faced with the earlier authority of Murray.12 The first point to note is what constitutes the fundamental difference between Murray and McKenzie, namely the claimed source for the respective implied terms that featured in these two cases. In Murray, Cameron JA clearly held that the basis for the implied term of fair dealing was the constitutional development of the common law (the duty of trust and confidence) in the light

of the constitutional right to fair labour practices. The source of the term was the section 23 right. In McKenzie, Wallis AJA (as observed above) expressly indicated that the respondent's claim was based on the argument that the unfair dismissal provisions of the LRA were to be imported into his contract of employment, and this was the basis upon which the case was decided. The claimed source of the term was Chapter VIII of the LRA. This brings into question Wallis AJA's reliance on the intention of the legislature in respect of whether statutory provisions should be incorporated into employment contracts. While I would suggest that the above reasoning in this regard is convincing, it may have missed the point.

Wallis AJA referred to statutory provisions which take the form of a mandatory injunction or of prohibiting or regulating otherwise permissible conduct as examples of legislative limitations on the parties' freedom of contract which are of a protective nature.13 He continued:

A relevant feature of some legislation of this type is that it not only confers rights but also provides a mechanism for the enforcement of those rights. Where that happens the question arises whether those means are exclusive and provide the sole means of enforcement or whether it is open to the beneficiary of the right to use the ordinary processes of the courts in order to enforce them. Another question that arises is whether the beneficiary of the right enjoys not only the benefit of the right itself but also a right to claim damages if the right is infringed ... If on a proper interpretation of the statute in question the legislature has confined a person harmed by a breach of the right conferred therein to the statutory remedy then resort to other means of enforcement is excluded. Accordingly both the scope of the right itself and the means of enforcing that right are determined by the intention of the legislature as ascertained on a proper interpretation of the legislation.14

He continued, then, to hold that "[i]t follows from the authorities mentioned in paragraph 7 of this judgment that it is now clearly established that in order to enforce the statutory right not to be unfairly dismissed as embodied in section 185 of the LRA an injured party must have resort to the tribunals established under the LRA, being either the CCMA or in some instances the Labour Court."15 The problem I have with this is that the authorities referred to in that paragraph of the judgment – Fedlife and Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality16 – were referred to as confirming that the civil courts retain their jurisdiction to hear claims arising from alleged breach of the contract of employment. These cases did not hold expressly that a dispute regarding dismissal cannot go to the civil courts (the majority in Fedlife held that the obverse is true), and it

appears Wallis AJA was simply confirming the judgment in Makhanya v University of Zululand17 to the effect that dismissal may give rise to more than one cause of action (depending on whether its fairness or its lawfulness is challenged).

What I find problematic is that this whole line of reasoning proceeds from the point of departure that the alleged source for an alleged additional cause of action (in the form of a breach of contract or of an implied contractual term) is the relevant legislative provision. The question Wallis AJA dealt with was whether the introduction of a legislative cause of action (for example, the right not to be unfairly dismissed) could be construed to provide an additional, extra-statutory cause of action (on the basis of an implied term). While this reasoning is, of course, in line with the respondent's claim in McKenzie as construed by Wallis AJA, it ignores the fact that, apart from the relevant legislative cause of action (for example, section 185 of the LRA), there may be another already existing cause of action – namely Murray's implied duty of fair dealing. The existence of this latter cause of action is not dependent on the intention of the legislature. In this sense, this first reason for rejecting the implication of an implied term not to be unfairly dismissed – as a species of unfair conduct which may offend against a duty of fair dealing – can relate only to the claimed implied term deriving from legislative provisions. It does not address the authority of Murray for recognising an existing implied term independent of legislation. This is one of the problems with Wallis AJA's judgment: in considering whether the employment contract contained an implied term of fairness upon dismissal, the learned judge never refers to Murray until at the very end of the judgment, where, as will be explained below, he then dismisses Murray as authority for such a term in a rather simplistic and terse manner.

The second reason provided by Wallis AJA for rejecting the importation of an implied term into the employment contract, which mirrors the statutory unfair dismissal provisions, related to the policy considerations behind the legislative formulation of the statutory unfair dismissal scheme. After referring to the Australian and United Kingdom (UK) case law which relied on the legislative intention behind a statutory unfair dismissal scheme to reject the application of the duty of trust and confidence to dismissal cases,18 Wallis AJA held that there was a further obstacle in the South African context for the recognition of an implied term not to be unfairly dismissed. The learned judge

was of the opinion that, in the light of the statutory scheme, the development of the common law to provide protection to employees covered by the LRA is unnecessary:

[W]here, as here, the employees are protected by the LRA, section 8(3) of the Constitution does not warrant or require an importation from the realm of constitutionally protected labour rights into individual contracts of employment by way of an implied term. The LRA specifically gives effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices and the consequent right not to be unfairly dismissed. Accordingly the constitutional basis for developing the common law of employment and thereby altering the contractual relationships is absent.19

In reply, I would suggest that there are two issues here with the reasoning in McKenzie. The first is the reliance on the legislative intention behind the establishment of a statutory unfair dismissal scheme being deemed to exclude reliance on a common-law duty of fair dealing which might provide a separate cause of action in cases of dismissal. I believe that Wallis AJA dealt with this rather superficially in two respects. Firstly, the reliance on dicta from foreign judgments seems to ignore the specific (and unique) South African context of the constitutional entrenchment of the right to fair labour practices. While Wallis AJA relied on the role of this right to bolster his argument that an extra-statutory cause of action in this context is not necessary, he ignored the fact that the Constitution calls on development of the common law where needed. One could question whether this reasoning regarding the supremacy of the statutory scheme seeks to raise the legislative intention above the Constitution and the single system of law principle. Secondly, even though the argument based on the wording of section 8(3) seems convincing, its application is predicated upon an assumption that the legislative rights and scheme do in fact give sufficient effect to a claimant's right to fair labour practices in a given case. As I will argue below, there are instances where employees may fall through the cracks of the labour legislation and may not be sufficiently protected, which may call for either the constitutional development of the common law (as in Murray) or for a constitutional challenge to the relevant legislative provisions.20 Also, I believe that Wallis AJA did not sufficiently interrogate the legislative intention behind Chapter VIII of the LRA, being apparently happy to accept that the legislature opted to establish a legislative unfair dismissal scheme without asking why, exactly, this scheme was established. This seems to smack of a measure of judicial deference to the legislature, and will be examined in more detail in section 2.3 in Part 3.

The third and final reason for Wallis AJA's rejection of the recognition of an implied term not to be unfairly dismissed rested on the consideration of the earlier authority of cases (mainly from the SCA21) which dealt with the importation of fairness into the employment contract. Here, at last, Wallis AJA also purported to deal with Murray.

In essence, Wallis AJA considered the preceding case law and held that the recognition of an implied right to a pre-dismissal hearing in the employment contract in Gumbi was obiter, and that subsequent judgments which relied on this did nothing to strengthen the weight of that finding and to make it law.22 I will not deal in detail with the analysis of these cases, mainly because the court in Murray did not rely on those judgments in formulating its view on the existence of the implied duty of fair dealing, and also because it has little bearing on Wallis AJA's subsequent dismissal of the authority of Murray in respect of the recognition of the implied duty of fair dealing.23

In dealing with Murray, Wallis AJA observed that he was not convinced that the common law required development in order to reach the conclusion in that case, and then proceeded to dismiss Murray by distinguishing the case as dealing with an employee claimant who was excluded from the protection of the labour legislation:

The constitutional rights that were drawn upon in [Murray] for importing into the contract a term protecting the employee against constructive dismissal are given full effect in relation to employees falling under the LRA by the definition of 'dismissal' in s 186(1). Murray seems to me to be authority for no more than the proposition that an employee who is not subject to the LRA enjoys the same

right as other employees not to be constructively dismissed, whatever else might have been said en passant.24

In reply to Wallis AJA's reasoning in this regard, I would suggest that this is dismissive of the clear authority of Murray regarding the existence of the duty of fair dealing and of the clear wording of Cameron JA.25 By observing that "the common law of employment must be held to impose on all employers a duty of fair dealing at all times with their employees – even those the LRA does not cover", Cameron JA was clearly not reserving recognition of the implied duty of fair dealing only to those employer/employee relationships which are excluded from the application of the LRA. His intention was clearly not to exclude, but rather to be inclusive in respect of the protection provided by this implied duty, in order to protect also those who find themselves outside the tent when it comes to the application of the labour legislation. I would suggest, in distinguishing Murray and McKenzie, that the claimant's SANDF-based exclusion from the application of the LRA was important only in providing a clear opportunity for Cameron JA to rely on his constitutionally-mandated duty to develop the common law where legislation does not provide protection for an affected claimant. Construing, as Wallis AJA did, the importance and application of Murray as being specific only to the extension of protection to those not covered by the LRA, and this only in respect of constructive dismissals, is to my mind a rather simplistic and dismissive26 manner of dealing with the clear authority of Murray in respect of the recognition of a significant development of the common-law contract to include a far-reaching implied duty regulating the conduct of the parties. The view expressed by Grant and Whitear-Nel, that Cameron J's statement in Murray on the existence of the common-law duty of fair dealing was obiter cannot be supported.27

Furthermore, it should be noted that in dismissing the authority of Murray as he did, Wallis AJA did not unequivocally reject the existence of an implied duty of fair dealing. In the very same paragraph in which he dismisses Murray, as quoted above, and observes that the common law may not have required development in that case, he also said the following (which related to the dictum quoted in the text to note 24 above):

What is important to bear in mind is that the effect of any extended duty of fair dealing must be worked out in individual cases in the light of the statutory provisions giving effect to the constitutional guarantee of fair labour practices ... It is possible that there is some need to develop the common law by importing into the contract of [employees not covered by the labour legislation] terms that give effect to their right to fair labour practices but that is not a matter that need now concern us.28

At best, McKenzie can stand as authority only for the denial of the recognition of an implied term not to be unfairly dismissed (which term derives from a reading the LRA's dismissal provisions into the employment contract). It does not purport to deny the existence of an implied duty of fair dealing, generally, in the employment contract. And, as I will argue below, even that more limited consequence of McKenzie is problematic.

3 Where are we now, after McKenzie?

The consensus of academic writers seems to be that McKenzie has overturned Murray in respect of the recognition of an implied duty of fair dealing in the employment contract.29 This is also the view expressed in a

number of judgments.30 In Manamela v Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs, Limpopo Province,31 the judgment of Snyman AJ (regarding a claim related to the alleged unfair suspension of an employee) provides a good illustration of such a reading of McKenzie as definitive and finally dispositive of the issue of an implied duty of fair dealing (which was also followed in subsequent cases):

[T]he Court in McKenzie has made it clear that the right of employees to fairness in the employment relationship is fully determined by the provisions of the LRA, and is subject to all the limitations in the LRA, and cannot be implied into the contract of employment, and of specific relevance to the current matter in any regulatory provisions dealing with suspension ... Therefore, the current state of the law, as I see it, is now clear. There is no general right of fairness to be implied into a contract of employment of an employee or in any other employment provisions at an employer, regulating the employment relationship ... If an employee wants to challenge the fairness of his or her suspension, based on any general right of fairness, this can only be done in terms of the unfair labour practice provisions of the LRA, and with it, the dispute resolution provisions prescribed by the LRA.32

I will argue, however, that this is reading too much into McKenzie. I have pointed out that Wallis AJA dealt rather dismissively and simplistically with the clear authority of Murray. And even in dismissing Murray, by attempting to distinguish the case as having dealt with the claim of an employee not covered by the LRA, Wallis AJA was somewhat ambiguous, stating that the effect of any extended duty of fair dealing must be worked out in individual cases in the light of the statutory provisions giving effect to the constitutional guarantee of fair labour practices.33 This, apparently, does not reflect a general intention to put paid to the duty of fair dealing in all its forms of potential application to the employment relationship. Wallis AJA's finding should probably be reduced to little more than his statement that "insofar as employees who are subject to and protected by the LRA are concerned, their

contracts are not subject to an implied term that they will not be unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair labour practices."34

More fundamentally, as discussed above, Wallis AJA's reasoning in McKenzie, while appearing cogent, was premised significantly on a different basis than that of Cameron JA in Murray. The ratios of these two judgments were very different. In McKenzie the claimant averred that his employer, in breach of an express, alternatively tacit, alternatively implied term that he would not be unfairly dismissed, had terminated his contract. After finding that there was no express or tacit term to this effect, Wallis AJA continued to extrapolate the claimant's case as being the following:

That leaves, as the foundation for the pleaded allegation, only the possibility of an implied term properly so called. Such a term could either be said to flow from the provisions of s185 of the LRA dealing with unfair dismissal or could lie in a development of the common law in accordance with section 39(2) of the Constitution. In argument the appellant based his case on the first of these and it is that argument that I now address.35

Accordingly, the ratio decidendi of the judgment in McKenzie was based on the fact that the source of the alleged implied duty of fairness which underpinned the claim was the unfair dismissal provisions contained in Chapter VIII of the LRA. And Wallis AJA's reasons for rejecting such an averment are sound (for example, the fact that implying a term which simply reiterated the provisions of the Act would constitute unnecessary duplication).36 But this loses sight of the fact that Cameron JA's recognition

of the implied duty of fair dealing in Murray was based very clearly on the constitutional development of the common-law obligations of trust and confidence inherent in the employment contract. For Cameron JA, the source of the implied term of fair dealing was the section 23 right to fair labour practices. In McKenzie it was correctly observed that the LRA is silent on the question of whether the dismissal provisions of the Act should be imported into the employment contract (and that the LRA and BCEA contain express provisions which stipulate that some of its provisions are to be read into contracts). So Mr. McKenzie could not show a statutory source for the reading-in of the dismissal provisions into his contract.37 But Commander Murray was more happily placed, in the sense that the Constitution itself, in section 39(2), provides the imprimatur for developing the law regulating his contract in the light of the section 23 right and the absence of legislative protection of this right for the claimant. Accordingly, I would submit that McKenzie should not be construed as constituting any "about-turn" or "backtracking" in the SCA's stance on an implied duty of fair dealing, or that it shows that the SCA has closed the door on the recognition of the importation of fairness into the contract of employment through the constitutional development of the common law.38 The case was simply decided on a different basis, and the clear and unequivocal statement in Murray which reflects the recognition of an implied duty of fair dealing must stand until such time as it may be overturned by the Labour Appeal Court39 or the Constitutional Court.

Apart from the fact that these two judgments were based on different premises (as explained earlier) and the fact that Wallis AJA in McKenzie seemed to misconstrue the clear wording of Cameron J's important dictum in Murray, it should be noted that the rationale of the McKenzie judgment is also more limited than it might seem at first glance. It is important to understand this, as the effect of McKenzie may otherwise be construed to be much broader than it really was. (For example, one commentator believes that this judgment has shut the door completely on common-law claims for breach of contract arising from dismissal, unless the employment contract contained an

express provision to that effect.40 Of course, this would be contrary to Fedlife and Makhanya). What Wallis AJA held in McKenzie was simply that the common-law employment contract does not include an implied term not to be unfairly dismissed. This does not constitute a wholesale rejection of the judicially recognised implied duty of mutual trust and confidence or of Murray's constitutionally developed implied duty of fair dealing. Accordingly, the ruling in McKenzie would purport to have the same effect as the so-called "Johnson exclusion zone"41 fashioned by the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys Limited,42 which has subsequently been taken to exclude only unfair dismissals from the reach of the implied duty of trust and confidence in that jurisdiction,43 and to leave unfair conduct by the employer short of dismissal (and during the employment relationship prior to a dismissal) untouched and actionable under the implied term.44 As Bosch observes with reference to the subsequent (to Johnson) decision of the House of Lords in Eastwood v Magnox Electric Plc:45

Lord Nicholls held that where an employee acquires a cause of action (like breach of contract) prior to dismissal, that cause of action remains unimpaired by the subsequent dismissal and the statutory rights flowing from it. Financial loss may flow from the employer's acting unfairly when taking steps leading to the dismissal (such as suspension) or causing an employee to suffer financial loss from psychiatric or other illness caused by the employer's pre-dismissal

treatment of the employee. In those cases the employee may bring a common-law claim which precedes and is independent of the subsequent dismissal.46

Accordingly, even if the judgment in McKenzie is correct in having dismissed the notion of an implied duty on the employer not to unfairly dismiss the employee47 (which I am not convinced is the case, as I will explain below), it is submitted that this judgment does not constitute the wholesale rejection of the application of the implied duty of fair dealing in multiple facets of the employment relationship, as formulated in Murray. In fact, Wallis AJA seemed to say as much.48

And this raises the spectre of a rather paradoxical and problematic result, if it has created a "McKenzie exclusion zone" where Murray's implied duty of fair dealing applies to employer conduct short of dismissal or prior to dismissal but not to dismissal itself. The paradox was referred to in argument in the Australian High Court case of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v

Barker49 (which rejected the notion of the recognition of the implied duty of trust and confidence in Australian employment contracts). The claimant (the respondent) in that case argued that the area left for the operation of the implied term of trust and confidence as formulated in the UK House of Lords case of Malik and Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA50 is therefore with respect to "trust-destroying conduct" on the part of an employer which does not have the consequence of ending the employment relationship. Writing his minority judgment, Kiefel J summarised the parties' arguments as follows:

The respondent suggests that a term by which damages are awarded for "trust-destroying conduct" would promote the maintenance of the employment relationship. The appellant submits to the contrary and that the effect of implying the term of trust and confidence is not likely to be the maintenance of employment relationships, but the greater likelihood of their termination. For instance, an employer, faced with the possibility of a claim for common law damages for wrongfully suspending an employee, or a claim for unfair dismissal for which compensation would be limited, may be inclined to choose dismissal.51

Excluding dismissal from the area of application of the implied duty of fair dealing (if the existence of this duty was not rejected in toto in McKenzie by overturning Murray, as I argue is the case) may very well leave employers with the potential to forum-shop, in anticipando, in order to bring any potential fall-out of its unfair conduct within the strictures of a CCMA claim where compensation is capped, rather than before the civil courts where large awards for damages may be incurred.52 This, surely, would fly in the face of the intention of the legislature in fashioning the LRA's unfair dismissal scheme in order to protect employees, and foster employment and the maintenance of the employment relationship.

Writing in 2008 Du Toit referred to Hepple's53 explanation of the interaction between statutory and common-law rights in the employment sphere (in the UK context):

The common law of employment and statutory rights [Hepple] argued, "are imbricated, like overhanging roof-tiles, and keep each other in place. Their separation in Johnson v Unisys and other cases means there is a leaky roof." In South Africa the approach in Johnson [v Unisys] has been rejected.

These views were expressed prior to the McKenzie judgment. If McKenzie is indeed to be read as having mimicked the creation of a "Johnson exclusion zone" in South African law, which has rejected the application of a duty of fair dealing only in dismissal (and, possibly, unfair labour practice) cases while leaving its application to all other aspects of the employment relationship intact, this would similarly constitute a "leaky roof" scenario. I believe such an interpretation of McKenzie is untenable. While, as I have argued above, I do not believe that McKenzie has overturned Murray on the recognition of the implied duty of fair dealing, I believe that even such a more restricted interpretation (excluding recourse to such a duty only in unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice claims) is just as objectionable. And I will argue in Part 3 of this piece that popular arguments in favour of such an exclusion (the overlap between unlawfulness and unfairness, and the policy reasons behind the establishment of a discrete statutory unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice dispute resolution scheme) are not as convincing as they may appear at first glance.

4 Conclusion

Having considered the judgments of the SCA which sought to develop the common law in order to import fairness into the employment contract, as well as having argued that McKenzie's purported rejection of Murray's implied duty of fair dealing is an erroneous interpretation of the effects of McKenzie, I will in Part 3 of this piece consider the main arguments for and against the continued recognition of such a duty.

Bibliography

Literature

Bosch 2006 ILJ

Bosch C "The Implied Term of Trust and Confidence in South African Labour Law" 2006 ILJ 28-47

Cohen 2010 SA Merc LJ

Cohen T "Jurisdiction over Employment Disputes - Light at the End of the Tunnel?" 2010 SA Merc LJ 417-428

Conradie 2016 Fundamina

Conradie M "The Constitutional Right to Fair Labour Practices: A Consideration of the Influence and Continued Importance of the Historical Regulation of (Un)Fair Labour Practices Pre-1977" 2016 Fundamina 163-204

Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook

Currie J and De Waal I The Bill of Rights Handbook 6th ed (Juta Cape Town 2013)

Doorey 2005 Queen's LJ

Doorey DJ "Employer 'Bullying': Implied Duties of Fair Dealing in Canadian Employment Contracts" 2005 Queen's LJ 500-559

Du Toit 2008 SALJ

Du Toit D "Oil on Troubled Waters? The Slippery Interface between the Contract of Employment and Statutory Labour Law" 2008 SALJ 95-133

Geldenhuys 2016 PELJ

Geldenhuys J "The Reinstatement and Compensation Conundrum in South African Labour Law" 2016 PELJ 1-39

Grant and Whitear-Nel 2013 SALJ

Grant B and Whitear-Nel N "Can an Employee Claim Damages as a Result of a Breach of an Implied Contractual Term that He will not be Unfairly Dismissed? South African Maritime Safety Authority v Mckenzie" 2013 SALJ 309-317

Grogan Workplace Law

Grogan J Workplace Law 12th ed (Juta Cape Town 2017)

Hepple Rights at Work

Hepple B Rights at Work: Global, European and British Perspectives (Oxford University Press Oxford 2005)

Van Eck and Mathiba 2014 ILJ

Van Eck BPS and Mathiba MK "Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act: Thoughts on the Jurisdictional Overlap, the Restoration of the Labour Appeal Court and the Demotion of the Supreme Court of Appeal" 2014 ILJ 863-879

Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work

Van Niekerk A and Smit N (eds) Law@Work 3rd ed (LexisNexis Durban 2015)

Van Staden and Smit 2010 TSAR

Van Staden M and Smit N "The Regulation of the Employment Relationship and the Re-emergence of the Contract of Employment" 2010 TSAR 702-719

Wahlstrom-Schatt Dismissal of the Implied Term of Mutual Trust

Wahlstrom-Schatt O The Dismissal of the Implied Term of Mutual Trust and Confidence in Employment Contracts: Filling the Gap Left Behind (Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law, University of Melbourne Melbourne 2017)

Case law

Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya 2007 5 SA 450 (SCA)

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker 2014 HCA 32

Eastwood v Magnox Electric Plc; McCabe v Cornwall County Council 2004 UK HL 35

Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 1 SA 49 (SCA)

Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council 2000 IRLR 703

Goussard v Impala Platinum Ltd 2012 33 ILJ 2898 (LC)

Gxolo v Harmony Gold Mine (Pty) Ltd (LC) unreported case number J1124/2017 of 27 October 2017

Johnson v Unisys Limited 2001 UKHL 13

Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 30 ILJ 1539 (SCA)

Malik and Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA 1997 UKHL 23

Manamela v Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement and Traditional Affairs, Limpopo Province (CJHB) unreported case number 1886/2013 of 5 September 2013

Moloto v City of Cape Town 2011 32 ILJ 1153 (LC)

Murray v Minister of Defence 2009 3 SA 130 (SCA)

Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 5 SA 552 (SCA)

SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601 (SCA)

Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality 2009 2 SA 628 (ECD)

Legislation

Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997

Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012

Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995

List of Abbreviations