Cloete Murray v Firstrand Bank Ltd T/A Wesbank [2015] ZASCA 39 (case note)

Abstract

AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die appèlsaak Cloete Murray and another v FirstRand Bank Ltd wat onlangs deur die Appèlhof beslis is, het die benadering tot die interpretasie van wetgewing weereens in die kollig beland. Die hof in hierdie aangeleentheid het benadruk dat die beginpunt as dit kom by die interpretasie van wetgewing, behoort altyd die taal van die spesifieke wetgewing, ordonnansie of bepaling wees. Dit moet gebruik word te same met die konteks waarbinne die wetgewing geskep en gevorm is, asook die doel van die bepaling en die agtergrond waarbinne die bepaling geskep is. Indien die taal van die spesifieke bepaling ʼn onvermoë toon om die betekenis te ondersteun waarvoor geargumenteer word, behoort laasgenoemde nie aanvaar te word nie. Artikel 39(2) van die Grondwet kan ook net gebruik word om die waardes van die Grondwet te ondersteun gedurende wetsuitleg indien dit nie in die proses die taal van die spesifieke bepaling onnodig belas nie. Op grond hiervan het die hof die appellante se argumente vir ʼn wyer interpretasie van artikel 133(1) van die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 verwerp en beslis ten gunste van die Respondent.

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ENGLISH SUMMARY: The approach to the interpretation of statutes once again received attention in the recent case Cloete Murray and another v FirstRand Bank Ltd which was decided in the Supreme Court of Appeal. The court , in this matter, emphasized the fact that when it comes to the interpretation of statutes, the starting point should always be the specific language of the statute, ordinance or section. This should be used together with the context within which the statute, ordinance or section has been created , as well as the purpose or objective of the statute, ordinance or section , and the background within which the statute, ordinance or section has been created. If the language of the specific statute, ordinance or section reflects an inability to support the specific meaning that is being argued, the latter should not be accepted. Section 39 (2) of the Constitution can also only be used to support and foster the values of the Constitution during interpretation if in the process of interpretation it does not unnecessarily burden the language of the specific statute or section. Based on this approach the court rejected the appellants’ appeal for a wider interpretation of section 133 (1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 , and therefore found in favour of the Respondent.